Abstract-In many cases, competing parties who have private data may collaboratively conduct privacy-preserving distributed data analysis (PPDA) tasks to learn beneficial data models or analysis results. Most often, the competing parties have different incentives. Although certain PPDA techniques guarantee that nothing other than the final analysis result is revealed, it is impossible to verify whether participating parties are truthful about their private input data. Unless proper incentives are set, current PPDA techniques cannot prevent participating parties from modifying their private inputs. This raises the question of how to design incentive compatible privacy-preserving data analysis techniques that motivate participating parties to provide truthful inputs. In this paper, we first develop key theorems, then base on these theorems, we analyze certain important privacy-preserving data analysis tasks that could be conducted in a way that telling the truth is the best choice for any participating party.
INTRODUCTION
P RIVACY and security, particularly maintaining confidentiality of data, have become a challenging issue with advances in information and communication technology. The ability to communicate and share data has many benefits, and the idea of an omniscient data source carries great value to research and building accurate data analysis models. For example, for credit card companies to build more comprehensive and accurate fraud detection system, credit card transaction data from various companies may be needed to generate better data analysis models. Department of Energy supports research on building much more efficient diesel engines [7] . Such an ambitious task requires the collaboration of geographically distributed industries, national laboratories, and universities. Those institutions (including potentially competing industry partners) need to share their private data for building data analysis models to understand the underlying physical phenomena.
An omniscient data source eases misuse, such as the growing problem of identity theft. To prevent misuse of data, there is a recent surge in laws mandating protection of confidential data, such as the European Community privacy standards [9] , U.S. health-care laws [17] , and California SB1386. However, this protection comes with a real cost through both added security expenditure and penalties and costs associated with disclosure. What we need is the ability to compute the desired "beneficial outcome" of data sharing for analyzing without having to actually share or disclose data. This would maintain the security provided by separation of control while still obtaining the benefits of a global data source.
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) [11] , [44] , [45] has recently emerged as an answer to this problem. Informally, if a protocol meets the SMC definitions, the participating parties learn only the final result and whatever can be inferred from the final result and their own inputs. A simple example is Yao's millionaire problem [44] : two millionaires, Alice and Bob, want to learn who is richer without disclosing their actual wealth to each other. Recognizing this, the research community has developed many SMC protocols, for applications as diverse as forecasting [5] , decision tree analysis [33] and auctions [37] among others.
Nevertheless, the SMC model does not guarantee that data provided by participating parties are truthful. In many real-life situations, data needed for building data analysis models are distributed among multiple parties with potentially conflicting interests. For instance, a credit card company that has a superior data analysis model for fighting credit card fraud may increase its profits as compared to its peers. An engine design company may want to exclusively learn the data analysis models that may enable it to build much more efficient diesel engines. Clearly, as described above, building data analysis models is generally performed among parties that have conflicting interests.
In SMC, we generally assume that participating parties provide truthful inputs. This assumption is usually justified by the fact that learning the correct data analysis models or results is in the best interest of all participating parties. Since SMC-based protocols require participating parties to perform expensive computations, if any party does not want to learn data models and analysis results, the party should not participate in the protocol. Still, this assumption does not guarantee the truthfulness of the private input data when participating parties want to learn the final result exclusively. For example, a drug company may lie about its private data so that it can exclusively learn the data analysis model. Although SMC protocols guarantee that nothing other than the final data analysis result is revealed, it is impossible to verify whether or not participating parties are truthful about their private input data. In other words, unless proper incentives are set, current SMC techniques cannot prevent input modification by participating parties.
To better illustrate this problem, we consider a case from management where competing companies (e.g., Texas Instruments, IBM and Intel) establish a consortium (e.g., Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology 1 ). The companies send the consortium their sales data, and key manufacturing costs and times. Then, the consortium analyzes the data and statistically summarizes them in a report of industry trends, which is made available back to consortium members. In this case, it is in the interest of companies to learn true industry trends while revealing their private data as little as possible. Even though SMC protocols can prevent the revelation of the private data, they do not guarantee that companies send their true sales data and other required information. Assume that n companies would like to learn the sample mean and variance of the sales data for a particular type of product. Example 1.1. Let x i be the ith company's sales amount. In order to estimate the sample mean, companies need to calculate ¼ and truthful values from the other parties), the company i can calculate the correct sample mean by setting
The correct sample variance s 2 can be calculated as
As illustrated above, any company may have the incentive to lie about its input in order to learn the result exclusively, and at the same time, the correct result (e.g., ) can be computed from its original input, modified input and the incorrect final result (e.g., x i , x 0 i , and 0 ). If this situation always occurred, no company would have the incentive to be truthful. Fortunately, the intrinsic nature of a function determines whether the situation (demonstrated by the above example) could occur.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we analyze what types of distributed functionalities could be implemented in an incentive compatible fashion. In other words, we explore which functionalities can be implemented in a way that participating parties have the incentive to provide their true private inputs upon engaging in the corresponding SMC protocols. We show how tools from theoretical computer science in general and noncooperative computation (NCC) [40] in particular could be used to analyze incentive issues in distributed data analysis framework. This is significant because input modification cannot be prevented before the execution of any SMC-based protocol. (Input modification could be prevented during the execution of some SMCbased protocols, but these protocols are generally expensive.) The theorems developed in the paper can be adopted to analyze whether or not input modification could occur for computing a distributed functionality. If the answer is positive, then there is no need to design complicated and generally inefficient SMC-based protocols.
In this paper, we assume that the number of malicious or dishonest participating parties can be at most n À 1, where n is the number of parties. This assumption is very general since most existing works in the area of privacy-preserving data analysis assume either all participating parties are honest (or semi-honest) or the majority of participating parties are honest. Thus, we extend the noncooperative computation definitions to incorporate cases where there are multiple dishonest parties. In addition, we show that from incentive compatibility point of view, most data analysis tasks need to be analyzed only for two party cases. Furthermore, to show the applicability of our developed theorems, we use these theorems to analyze under what conditions, common data analysis tasks, such as mean and covariance matrix estimation, can be executed in an incentive compatible manner.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the works closely related to this paper and background regarding the concept of noncooperative computation. In Section 3, we propose several important theorems along with formal proofs. Based on these theorems, Section 4 analyzes some common distributed data analysis tasks that are either incentive compatible or not incentive compatible in the context of this paper. Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of possible future research directions.
RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
We begin with an overview of privacy-preserving distributed data analysis. Then, we briefly discuss the concept of noncooperative computation. Table 1 provides common notations and terminologies used extensively for the rest of this paper. In addition, the terms secure and privacy preserving are interchangeable thereafter.
Privacy-Preserving Data Analysis
Many privacy-preserving data analysis protocols have been designed using cryptographic techniques. Data are generally assumed to be either vertically or horizontally partitioned. In the case of horizontally partitioned data, different sites collect the same set of information about different entities. For example, different credit card companies may collect credit card transactions of different individuals. Privacy-preserving distributed protocols have been developed for horizontally partitioned data for many different data mining tasks such as building decision trees, [32] , mining association rules, [26] , and generating k-means clusters [31] and k-nn classifiers.
In the case of vertically partitioned data, we assume that different sites collect information about the same set of entities, but they collect different feature sets. For example, both a university pay roll and the university's student health center may collect information about a student. Again, privacy-preserving protocols for the vertically partitioned case have been developed for many different data mining tasks such as association rules, [41] , building decision trees [8] and k-means clusters [19] . (See [43] for a survey of the results.) To our knowledge, all the existing techniques assume that each participating party use its true data during the distributed data mining protocol execution.
In addition to existing techniques that consider honestbut-curious model, there are techniques developed against malicious adversaries, such as [16] , [24] . Especially, in [16] , authors discuss how to prevent lying about inputs using "input-consistency checks." Basically, authors suggest checking whether the inputs satisfy some conditions that are known to be true about the inputs (e.g., a binary input vector cannot consist of all zeros). Although such approach could be useful in practice, it cannot prevent lying about inputs that satisfy the domain constraints (e.g., an adversary can lie about its binary vector by making sure that he does not use binary vectors that consists of all zeros as input). In our case, we suggest a different solution. Basically, we try to "incentivize" truth telling instead of preventing lying.
Shoham and Tennenholtz [40] define the class of NCC, or noncooperatively computable functions, and define specifically the Boolean functions which are NCC. In addition, the paper defined two additional classes, p-NCC and s-NCC, which stand for probabilistic-NCC and subsidized-NCC, respectively. p-NCC are the functions which are computable with some probability noncooperatively, and s-NCC are the functions which are computable when external monetary motivation is allowed. This was expanded to consider different motivations [35] and coalitions [4] . Our work is basically inspired by [40] , but we consider general data mining functions and develop additional techniques to show whether such functions are in NCC.
Much work seeks to include a game-theoretic model in standard secure multiparty computation. Instead of considering players who are honest, semihonest or malicious, the work simply considers players to be rational in the game theoretic sense. Much of this work concentrates on the problem of secret sharing; that is, dividing a secret number among players such that any quorum (sufficiently large subset) of them can reconstruct the secret number. This was first studied by Halpern and Teague [14] , and later reexamined by Gordon and Katz [13] . Other protocols for this problem were outlined in [1] and [34] . The paper by Ong et al. [39] hybridizes the two areas within the realm of secret sharing by assuming that some players are honest and a majority of players are rational. Other work seeks a broader realm of computation, such as [18] and [29] that build their computation model on a secret sharing model. There is other work that attempts to combine game theoretic and cryptographic methodologies, many of which are surveyed in [28] . Although these rational secure computation systems could be used to ensure privacy of the data mining techniques discussed in this paper, like other secure computation systems, they make no guarantees about the truthfulness of the inputs.
More closely related to the work in this paper, some work has attempted to enforce honest behavior among the participants in a data sharing protocol. Agrawal and Terzi [2] present a model which enforces honesty in data sharing through the use of auditing mechanisms. Layfield et al. in [30] present strategies which enforce honesty in a distributed computation without relying on a mediator. Jiang et al. in [20] integrate the auditing mechanism with secure computation to convert existing protocols into rationally secure protocols. Finally, the work of Kargupta et al. [27] analyzes each step of a multiparty computation process in terms of game theory, with the focus of preventing cheating within the process and removing coalitions from gameplay. Each of these deals with the problem of ensuring truthfulness in data mining. However, each one requires the ability to verify the data after the calculation. Although verification-based techniques are very useful, there are cases where verification is not feasible due to legal, social, and privacy concerns. For example, if two intelligence agencies from different countries are collaborating, one agency may not allow others to verify its database due to legal and security concerns. Our work enables new applications by showing what is possible when verification is not feasible and complements the existing verification based work. In addition, Nix and Kantarcioglu [25] present a model that enforces honesty in distributed data mining using monetary payments. In our case, we do not use any monetary payments to incentivize truth telling.
Noncooperative Computation
Recently, research issues at the intersection of computer science and game theory have been studied extensively. Among those research issues, algorithmic mechanism design and noncooperative computation are closely related to our work.
The field of algorithmic mechanism design tries to explore how private preferences of many parties could be combined to find a global and socially optimal solution [38] . Usually, in algorithmic mechanism design, there exists a function that needs to be maximized based on the private inputs of the parties, and the goal is to devise mechanisms and payment schemes that force individuals to tell their true private values. In our case, since it is hard to measure the monetary value of the data analysis results, devising a payment scheme that is required by many mechanism design models is not viable (e.g., Vickrey-Groves-Clarke mechanisms [38] ). Instead, we adopt the noncooperative computation model [40] that is designed for parties who want to jointly compute the correct function results on their private inputs. Since data analysis algorithms can be seen as a special case, modifying noncooperative computation model for our purposes is a natural choice.
The noncooperative computation model can be seen as an example of applying game theoretical ideas in a distributed computation setting [40] . In NCC, each party participates in a protocol to learn the output of some function f over the joint inputs of the parties. First, all participating parties send their private inputs securely to a trusted third party (TTP), then TTP computes f and sends back the result to every participating party. The NCC model makes the following assumptions:
1. Correctness. The first priority for every participating party is to learn the correct result. 2. Exclusiveness. If possible, every participating party prefers to learn the correct result exclusively. In other words, learning the correct result is the most important objective of every party. Other factors such as privacy and voyeurism could be also considered in the NCC setting. We omit such discussion here. Additional details can be found in [35] . In this paper, we use the NCC setting where each party wants to learn the data mining result correctly, if possible prefers to learn it exclusively. Also, we assume that revealing only the result does not violate privacy.
Under the correctness and exclusiveness assumptions, the NCC model is formally defined as follows: Given a set of n parties, for a party i, we denote its private input as Considering the above simple protocol does not limit its generality. Under the literature of SMC, the TTP can be replaced such that the required functionality (represented by f) is still computable without violating privacy regarding each participating party's private input [14] . The next definition states the conditions a function needs to satisfy under the NCC model. Definition 2.1 [40] . Let n; f be as above. Then, f is deterministically noncooperatively computable (DNCC), if the following holds: For any party i, every strategy ðt i ; g i Þ, and every v i 2 D, it is the case that
The above definition simply states what function could be computed in NCC setting deterministically (i.e., computation result is correct with probability one), and no party could correctly compute the correct result once the party lies about his or her inputs in a way that changes the original function result. In other words, if a party i replaces its true input v i with v 0 i and if fðv 0 i ; v Ài Þ 6 ¼ fðv i ; v Ài Þ, then party i should not be able to calculate the correct fðv i ; v Ài Þ from fðv 0 i ; v Ài Þ and v i . Note that strategy ðt i ; g i Þ means that the way the input is modified, denoted by t i , and the way the output is calculated, denoted by g i . In Example 1.1, t i can be considered as choosing a value different from the actual input, and g i can be considered as the ways the correct and s 2 are computed. Another implication of the above definition is that for any t i , the corresponding g i should be deterministic, because each party want to exactly compute the "correct" result.
In this paper, we mainly focus on the DNCC model instead of considering a probabilistic extension due to the following observations. First, as shown in [40] , if the v i values are independent, then a Boolean function 2 is in DNCC if and only if it is probabilistically noncooperatively computable. Second, even if v i values are not independent, it is shown that if a Boolean function is in DNCC, then it is also probabilistically noncooperatively computable [40] . Because of these observations, DNCC provides a good basis for understanding incentive issues in privacy preserving data analysis. We leave other possible extensions as a future work.
CHARACTERISTICS OF DNCC FUNCTIONS
As discussed previously, the term incentive compatible means that participating parties have the incentive or motivation to provide their actual inputs when they compute a functionality. Although SMC-based privacy-preserving data analysis protocols (under the malicious adversary model) can prevent participating parties from modifying their inputs once the protocols are initiated, they cannot prevent the parties from modifying their inputs before the execution. On the other hand, parties are expected to provide their true inputs to correctly evaluate a function that satisfies the NCC model. Therefore, any functionality that satisfies the NCC model is inherently incentive compatible under the assumption that participating parties prefer to learn the function result correctly, and if possible exclusively. Now, the question is which functionalities or data analysis tasks satisfy the NCC model. For the rest of the paper, we first develop certain key theorems regarding NCC functions. Based on these theorems, we subsequently analyze functionalities that can be implemented under (or satisfy) the NCC model.
Based on Definition 2.1, it is difficult to prove whether a function f is in DNCC because the proof needs to consider all possible t i and g i pairs. The strategy t i defines a way to change the input, and the strategy g i defines a method to reconstruct the actual result based on the true input, modified input and the result computed based on the modified input and other parties' input data. Example 3.1. For instance, according to Example 1.1 in Section 1, the strategy t i can be considered as
; where c could be any real number. In addition, to compute the sample mean, the strategy g i is defined as
To compute the sample variance, g i is defined as
For complex functionalities, it is very difficult to enumerate all possible t i and g i pairs. To avoid this issue, we instead develop the following theorem that describes a simpler way to prove that a function is in DNCC. Before we prove the theorem, we need to emphasize the fact that in DNCC setting, a party only lies if it can always compute the correct result from the wrong result (based on its modified input and the other parties' inputs) and its original input. Therefore, for any t i , the corresponding g i is deterministic. Using this fact, it can be proved that if f satisfies the conditions of the above theorem, then f is in DNCC.
Proof. Please note that Theorem 3.1 is very similar to Definition 2. Þ, then f satisfies Definition 2.1, and we can conclude that f is in DNCC. We will achieve this by proving that for all g i functions either
First, please note that g i is deterministic and fðt i ðv i Þ; v Ài Þ ¼ fðt i ðv i Þ; y Ài Þ, then we know that
Now, consider the following two cases:
Since we are given that fðv i ; v Ài Þ 6 ¼ fðv i ; y Ài Þ, we can conclude that
Using (1) We would like to stress that Theorem 3.1 only states a sufficient condition for a function to be in DNCC. In Section 4, we show how Theorem 3.1 provides guidance for proving some common functionalities that satisfy the DNCC model.
We illustrate how the above theorem could be used for proving certain functions are in DNCC using the following function
where each ðY i ; C i Þ belongs to party i.
. Then, we can prove that 
This contradicts the initial assumption that u 0 6 ¼ u. Therefore, we can conclude that fðv 1 ; v 2 Þ 6 ¼ fðv 1 ; y 2 Þ.
Although, the above proof assumes Y i is a real number, the proof could be directly applied if Y i 2 R pÂp .
Collusion Regarding the NCC Model
When evaluating certain privacy-preserving protocols in practice, we need to consider the case where an adversary may control a subset of the parties involved in the protocol. Such an adversary may force the parties it controls to submit wrong inputs. In order to analyze functionalities that are incentive compatible when collusion is possible, the current DNCC model needs to be extended to include the possibility of collusion. In other words, we need to understand that given f is in DNCC, whether or not f is still in DNCC when collusion occurs. To analyze this, we continue to follow the correctness and exclusiveness assumptions under the NCC model. Based on the assumptions, we next define the DNCC functions for the case where an adversary controls at most t fixed parties. Intuitively, the above definition indicates that any adversary that controls at most t parties is not able to exclusively learn the correct function result. Clearly, if we can prove that a function is ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC, then this implies that an adversary that controls at most n À 1 parties is not able to exclusively learn the correct result by modifying the inputs.
For many distributed data analysis tasks, we need to compute functions that have a special structure. For example, assuming that data sets are horizontally partitioned, any distributed data mining function fðd 1 ; . . . ; d n Þ defined over n databases d 1 ; . . . ; d n could be rewritten as fðd i ; wðd Ài ÞÞ, where wðd Ài Þ is an inputs combining function, e.g., union, intersection, max or min. In other words, w determines how these inputs are used in f. In general, for any function fðv 1 ; . . . ; v n Þ which can be rewritten as fðv i ; wðv Ài ÞÞ for any i and some function w, we can show that f is ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC if and only if f is ð2; 1Þ-DNCC. Proof. If f is ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC for any n, f is ð2; 1Þ-DNCC (by setting n ¼ 2). Next, we need to show that if f is not ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC for some n (say n ¼ 3), then f is not ð2; 1Þ-DNCC. Suppose f is not ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC. Then, according to Definition 3.1, 9S & f1; . . . ; ng, 9ðt S ; g S Þ and 9v S such that the following holds simultaneously:
. 9v ÀS : fðt S ðv S Þ; v ÀS Þ 6 ¼ fðv S ; v ÀS Þ. Using such t S ; g S , we can define a cheating strategy for ð2; 1Þ-DNCC case. Set v i ¼ wðv S Þ, and define t i ðv i Þ for the two party case as follows: Since v i is equal to wðv S Þ, set t i ðv i Þ ¼ wðt S ðv S ÞÞ and g i ðfðt i ðv i Þ; v Ài Þ; v i Þ ¼ g S ðfðt i ðv i Þ; v Ài Þ; v S Þ. This strategy works if t S ; g S exist because (without loss of generality, assume jSj ¼ n À 1):
Note that in the above case v ÀS ¼ v Ài . Also we know that fðt S ðv S Þ; v ÀS Þ 6 ¼ fðv S ; v ÀS Þ for some v ÀS . This
The effects of an adversary that controls multiple parties have been studied in SMC domain extensively. The general results indicate that any function could be evaluated privately (i.e., nothing other than the function result is revealed) if an adversary is computationally bounded and does not control the majority of the parties (i. 12] ). This result is still valid if the adversary is rational [14] . Using the ideas from [14] , we can easily show that every function in DNCC has a b nÀ1 2 c private evaluation without requiring a trusted third party. 
ANALYZING DATA ANALYSIS TASKS UNDER

Function with Boolean Output
From SMC literature, we know that there are few functions that can be evaluated if the adversary controls n À 1 parties. Here, we prove that functions with Boolean outputs that are n À 1 private are not in DNCC.
Theorem 4.1 [6] . A function from f :
; 1g is n À 1-private if there exits a protocol f so that no coalition of size n À 1 can infer any additional information from the execution, other than the function result. Further more, f is n À 1 private if and only if it can be represented as
where f i s are arbitrary functions with Boolean outputs and È is the binary XOR operation. Proof. According to Theorem 4.1, we know that any n À 1 private function is of the form:
Clearly, for any t i , we can define the g i as
Note that g i function will always give the correct result for all possible v Ài because
To complete the proof that f is not in DNCC, we also need to show that there exists v Ài such that fðt i ðv i Þ; [26] , [41] for examples). Here, we show that common set operations like intersection and union are not in DNCC. Let us assume that each party i has a set S i , a subset of publicly known universal set U. For example, assuming that each party is a financial institution, S i could be a set of customers' social security numbers of party i and U could be the set of all nine digit numbers. As before, let S Ài denote ðS 1 ; . . . ; S iÀ1 ; S iþ1 ; . . . ; S n Þ. Proof. In order to prove that f is not in ðn; 1Þ-DNCC, we need to provide a correct ðt i ; g i Þ pair that works on S i and S Ài . We also need to prove that t i prevents the correct function evaluation for some S Ài (i.e., 9S Ài such that fðt i ðS i Þ; S Ài Þ 6 ¼ fðS i ; S Ài Þ). We can define t i ðS i Þ ¼ S i n S 0 where S 0 is any nonempty subset of S i . The corresponding g i could be defined as
The above g i works because S 0 S i implies S i ¼ ðS i n S 0 Þ [ S 0 . To conclude, we need to show there exists S Ài such that fðt i ðS i Þ; S Ài Þ 6 ¼ fðS i ; S Ài Þ. Note that for any S 0 and S Ài where S 0 \ ð[ j6 ¼i S j Þ ¼ ;, we know that
This implies that fðt i ðS i Þ; S Ài Þ 6 ¼ fðS i ; S Ài Þ. t u Theorem 4.4. Let fðS 1 ; . . . ; S n Þ ¼ S 1 \ Á Á Á \ S n . Then, f is not in ðn; 1Þ-DNCC.
Proof. We need to define ðt i ; g i Þ that works for a chosen S i and show there exists S Ài for any S i such that fðt i ðS i Þ; S Ài Þ 6 ¼ fðS i ; S Ài Þ. Let S 0 U and S i \ S 0 ¼ ;.
The g i works correctly because S i \ S 0 ¼ ; and ðS i [ S 0 Þ n S 0 ¼ S i . Also, we need to show that for any S i , there exists S Ài such that fðt i ðS i Þ; S Ài Þ 6 ¼ fðS i ; S Ài Þ. Let us assume S 0 \ ð\ j6 ¼i S j Þ 6 ¼ ;. In that case,
Since S 0 \ ð\ j6 ¼i S j Þ 6 ¼ ;, we can conclude that fðt i ðS i Þ; S Ài Þ 6 ¼ fðS i ; S Ài Þ. t u
Multivariate Statistics
In many distributed data mining tasks, we may need to learn the mean and the covariance of the underlying data set. For example, to build a mixture of Gaussian model for classification, we may want to learn the mean and the covariance matrix of each class [10] . Let us assume that X 1 ; X 2 ; . . . ; X N are identically and independently distributed 1 Â p row vectors (or a tuple in a data set) where EðX k Þ ¼ and AE ¼ EððX k À Þ T ðX k À ÞÞ. Let X v k denotes the vth column of the row vector X k . We can estimate and AE as " and " AE:
In our analysis, we consider two different data partition cases: the horizontally partitioned data and vertically partitioned data. In the case of horizontally partitioned data, each party i owns a set S i where S i \ S j ¼ ; for any i and j, and [ . . . ; pg (p indicates the number of attributes or columns). Next, we discuss whether "
and " AE could be evaluated in the DNCC model on horizontally partitioned and vertically partitioned data.
Horizontally Partitioned Data
For the horizontally partitioned case, we will show that if the total number of vectors are private (i.e., N is private), then the functions computing "
and " AE are in ð2; 1Þ-DNCC. If N is a public information, then the functions computing " and " AE are not in ðn; 1Þ-DNCC. Consider Example 1.1, in this example, the total number of vectors is equal to the total number of parties. Since the total number of parties is a public information, the functions computing the mean and the variance are not in DNCC.
To prove that the functions computing " and " AE are not in DNCC when N is public, we first prove that any linear function is not in DNCC. Then, we will show functions computing "
and " AE are linear functions if N is public. 
Proof. For any t i , we can define g i as follows:
To conclude the proof, we need to show that there exists v Ài such that fðt i ðv i Þ; v Ài Þ 6 ¼ fðv i ; v Ài Þ. and " AE on horizontally partitioned data are in ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC. To prove the above statement, we first prove that f : ðR; Z þ Þ n 7 ! R defined below is in ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC fððY 1 ; C 1 Þ; . . . ; ðY n ; C n ÞÞ ¼
Note that if we set Y i ¼ P
. . . ; ðY n ; C n ÞÞ. Likely, if we set
then we can compute " AE ¼ fððY 1 ; C 1 Þ; . . . ; ðY n ; C n ÞÞ. To prove that fððY 1 ; C 1 Þ; . . . ; ðY n ; C n ÞÞ is in ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC, we use Theorem 3.2. Let v i ¼ ðY i ; C i Þ. First note that f satisfies the requirements of Theorem 3.2, due to the fact that fðv i ; v Ài Þ ¼ fðv i ; wðv Ài ÞÞ for wðv Ài Þ ¼ ð P j6 ¼i Y j ; P j6 ¼i C j Þ. Therefore, showing that f is in ð2; 1Þ-DNCC will automatically imply that f is in ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC. Please note that for two party case, f becomes fððY 1 ; C 1 Þ; ðY 2 ; C 2 ÞÞ ¼ ðY 1 þ Y 2 Þ=ðC 1 þ C 2 Þ and using the proof given in Example 3.2, we can conclude that f is in ð2; 1Þ-DNCC.
Vertically Partitioned Data
In the case of vertically partitioned data, each party i owns all X v value as in the example given in Section 1. Therefore, for the vertically partitioned data case, the function computing "
is not in ðn; 1Þ-DNCC.
Also, we can show that computing " AE is not in ðn; 1Þ-DNCC. First note that " AE uv could be computed as 
Clearly, ðt i ; g i Þ works for any nonzero scalar . Also,
Privacy-Preserving Association Rule Mining
In this section, we first summarize the association rule mining and analyze whether the association rule mining can be done in an incentive compatible manner over horizontally and vertically partitioned databases.
Overview of Association Rule Mining
The association rules mining problem can be defined as follows [3] . Let I ¼ fi 1 ; i 2 ; . . . ; i n g be a set of items. Let DB be a set of transactions, where each transaction T is an item set such that T I. Given an item set X I, a transaction T contains X if and only if X T . An association rule is an implication of the form X ) Y where X I; Y I and X \ Y ¼ ;. The rule X ) Y has support s in the transaction database DB if s percent of transactions in DB contain X [ Y . The association rule holds in the transaction database DB with confidence c if c percent of transactions in DB that contain X also contain Y. An item set X with k items called k-item set. The problem of mining association rules is to find all rules whose support and confidence are higher than certain user specified minimum support and confidence. In this simplified definition of the association rules that we use in this paper, missing items and negative quantities are not considered. In this respect, transaction database DB can be seen as 0=1 matrix where each column is an item and each row is a transaction.
Horizontally Partitioned Data
The above problem of mining association rules can be extended to distributed environments. Let us assume that a transaction database DB is horizontally partitioned among n parties where DB ¼ DB 1 [ DB 2 [ Á Á Á [ DB n , and DB i resides at party i's site (1 i n) . The item set X has local support count of X:sup i at party i if X:sup i of the transactions contain X. The global support count of X is given as X:sup ¼ P n i¼1 X:sup i . An item set X is globally supported if X:sup ! s Á P n i¼1 jDB i j. Global confidence of a rule X ) Y can be given as fX [ Y g:sup=X:sup.
The set of large item sets L ðkÞ consists of all k-item sets that are globally supported. The aim of distributed association rule mining is to find the sets L ðkÞ for all k > 1 and the support counts for these item sets, and from this, association rules with the specified minimum support and confidence can be computed.
In [26] , authors discuss how to convert a fast distributed association rule mining algorithm to a privacy-preserving association rule mining algorithm. Although, for efficiency purposes, authors use secure set union to calculate the union of locally large item sets, this calculation reveals some information and may not be desirable for some applications [26] . As discussed in [26] , to enable a more strictly privacypreserving version, it is enough to securely check whether a candidate large item set is globally supported. Thus, if the protocol is strictly secure (e.g., without leaking additional information like the secure set union protocol) under the SMC definitions, it is sufficient to show checking if a candidate item set is globally supported is in DNCC.
First note that, to check if a candidate item set X is supported globally, all we need to know is whether X:sup ! s Á jDBj. The following allows us to reduce this to a comparison against the sum of local values (the excess support at each party)
Let Y i be the local excess support at party i (i.e., Y i ¼ ðX:sup i À s Á jDB i jÞ). We next show the predicate fðY 1 ; . . . ; Y n Þ: ð P n i ðY i Þ ! 0Þ is in ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC. Theorem 4.8. Given a candidate item set X, checking X:sup ! s Á jDBj is in ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC.
Proof. As noted above checking X:sup ! s Á jDBj is equivalent to evaluate the predicate fðY 1 ; . . . ; Y n Þ:
wðY Ài ÞÞ. Based on Theorem 3.2, to show f is ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC, it is sufficient to show that f is in ð2; 1Þ-DNCC. For the two party case, we can define the predicate as fðY 1 ; Y 2 Þ: ðY 1 ! ÀY 2 Þ. As a result, we merely need to show that the comparison function is in ð2; 1Þ-DNCC for arbitrary real number inputs.
If we can show that the conditions stated in Theorem 3.1 hold, we can conclude f is in ð2; 1Þ-DNCC for any t i . Suppose
is the true input of the first (second) user. We define t 1 ðv 1 Þ as the modified input of party 1 and let t 1 ðv 1 Þ À v 1 ¼ r, for some value r. When r is 0, we say t i is the identity function, and for the identity function, the condition "Or 8v Ài 2 D Ài , fðt i ðv i Þ; v Ài Þ ¼ fðv i ; v Ài Þ" holds automatically. For the rest of the proof, we consider the situation where r 6 ¼ 0. Based on the r value, we consider two cases:
This implies that the first condition of Theorem 3.1 is satisfied. 2. Assume r < 0, consider the case where
This implies that the first condition of Theorem 3.1 is satisfied. As a result, we conclude that f is in ð2; 1Þ-DNCC. t u Again as shown in [26] , we can use the f described above to check if the confidence threshold is satisfied for any candidate rule of the form X ) Y . One interesting consequence of the above result is that composition of the DNCC functions should be carefully checked to see whether or not the composition is in DNCC. Note that even though gðY 1 ; . . . ; Y n Þ: 
Vertically Partitioned Data
Given the transaction database DB as 0=1 matrix, where each column is an item and each row is a transaction, the DB is considered vertically partitioned if different parties know different columns of the DB. To mine association rules over vertically partitioned data, it has been shown that you need to calculate a dot product with 0=1 vectors, where each vector represents whether a certain set of items are present in a transaction or not [41] . Therefore, if we can show that functions calculating dot product with binary vectors is in DNCC, then using the results from [41] , we can conclude that calculating an support count of an item set is also in DNCC.
Below we show that calculating the dot product of nonzero binary vectors is in ð2; 1Þ-DNCC. (In this context, we call a vector, nonzero vector if at least one of the entries is nonzero.) Before we proceed with the proof, we stress that the following theorem is not a contradiction with our earlier result that shows that the function computing dot product of real-valued vectors is not in DNCC. Note that t i described for the dot product of real valued vectors will no longer work in the context of binary vectors since you can only multiply each entry with zero or one. Another important detail to note is we assume that the binary vectors are nonzero vectors. This assumption is important because if we allow zero vectors, the dot product result could be exactly determined even without any computation by the owner of the zero vector. Thus, the owner of the zero vector could lie about its input easily.
We believe that the assumption of nonzero binary vectors is realistic because with fairly large databases, it is highly likely that there exists at least one transaction that supports the required item. Proof. Let U be the set of indexes from f1; . . . ; kg. Let S 1 be any subset of U such that 8j 2 S 1 ; v 
All v j 1 s, where j 6 2 S 1 , are equal to zero, and all v j 1 s, where j 2 S 1 , are equal to one. Similarly, given t 1 and the associated set C, we can represent fðt 1 ðv 1 Þ; v 2 Þ as
Note that all v 
Now, consider y 2 and v 2 such that P j2S1 ðv 
Clearly, 
Therefore, we can conclude that f is in ð2; 1Þ-DNCC. t u
Privacy-Preserving Naive Bayes Classification
In naive Bayes classification [15] , building the data mining model involves determining the probability that an instance is of a certain class given that it has certain values for its other attributes. To classify an unlabeled instance, we simply compute our estimated likelihood for each class as follows: P rðC ¼ cÞ Q k i¼1 P rðA i ¼ v i jC ¼ cÞ for class value c and attribute values v 1 ; . . . ; v k . This implies that to build privacy-preserving Naive Bayes classification models, we need to estimate the probability P rðA i ¼ v i jC ¼ cÞ that attribute A i has value v i given that class value is c. Below we show that for both vertically and horizontally partitioned data, computing such probabilities is in DNCC.
Horizontally Partitioned Data
To compute P rðA i ¼ v i jC ¼ cÞ in the horizontally partitioned case, in [42] , it is shown that each party needs to compute a function of the form fððY 1 ; C 1 Þ; . . . ; ðY n ; C n ÞÞ ¼ P n i Y i P n i C i where ðY i ; C i Þ belongs to party i. As shown in Theorem 4.6, this function is ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC. Therefore, learning Naive Bayes models in horizontally partitioned data case is in ðn; n À 1Þ-DNCC.
Vertically Partitioned Data
Suppose one party has the class attribute of the data, and another party has some other attribute A i . To build the model, we would need to compute P rðA i ¼ v i jC ¼ cÞ for each value v i and class value c. One way of doing this is, for each value v i , to create a vector of length n (where n is the number of instances), whose jth location is one if jth instance's A i attribute has value v i , and zero otherwise. Similarly, we can create vectors for each class value c where jth location is 1 if jth instance's class value is c, and zero otherwise. Then, for each pair ðv i ; cÞ for attribute A i , we compute the dot product of the corresponding two vectors, which gives us the number of instances where A i ¼ v i and C ¼ c. This can be divided by the total number of instances where C ¼ c to estimate the probability P rðA i ¼ v i jC ¼ cÞ. Note that the dot products involved in this case are computed over binary vectors. Therefore, we can use Theorem 4.9 to prove that learning Naive Bayes models in vertically partitioned case is in (2,1)-DNCC.
Privacy-Preserving Decision Tree Classification
The aim of a decision tree is to provide classification criteria based on the attributes of a data set. At each node of a decision tree, the data are "split" into several subsets of data based on the criterion of information gain. The information gain of a split is defined as the average difference in entropy between the original data set, and each data set formed by the split.
In the Id3 and C4.5 decision trees [15] , the sets for the split are chosen based on a single attribute. The construction of the tree proceeds as follows: 1) Determine the attribute that has the greatest information gain (or equivalently minimum conditional entropy). 2) Use that attribute to split the data set. 3) Repeat this process within each subset until no splits give significant information gain. At this point the tree is complete.
Horizontally Partitioned Data
In [33] , it is shown that in the horizontally partitioned data case, after secure computation step, the random shares of the conditional entropy for an attribute are distributed to each party. Given the random share of party j for conditional entropy of attribute A i (S j A i ), parties (assuming there are n parties) need to find the attribute A k for which the P n j¼1 ðS j Ak Þ mod F (for some large prime F ) is minimum. Note that such minimum could be computed using series of comparisons. Since we proved that comparison is in (2,1)-DNCC and from Claim 5.1 (given in Section 5), we can conclude that learning decision trees in horizontally partitioned case is in (2,1)-DNCC.
Vertically Partitioned Data
One way to calculate the probabilities used in the conditional entropy for the vertically partitioned data case is to have both parties create a zero-one vector with the length of the data set, where the value at position i is one if the ith instance could be in the partition, and have class C according to the party's data, and zero otherwise. The dot product of these two vectors gives the number of rows which could belong to the given node according to both parties' data, and therefore gives the number of rows which belong to that node. We would again compute the dot product, and divide it by the total number of instances in the partition. From Theorem 4.9, learning decision tree models in vertically partitioned case is in (2,1)-DNCC.
USING NON-DNCC FUNCTIONS IN AN INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE WAY
According to our previous analyses, some functions like sum, set union and set intersection are not in DNCC, but they can still be used in an incentive-compatible way in PPDA applications. The reason is that in many applications, primitives like sum, set union and intersection are not used alone, and they often act as subroutines. To have a completely secure protocol, the subroutines can only return random shares of the expected results. For example, suppose a PPDA application uses the set intersection as a subroutine to compute the intersection between two sets D 1 and D 2 . To achieve the best security, the subroutine produces two random numbers 1 and 2 (from a certain field), such that 1 þ 2 ¼ jD 1 \ D 2 j. Subsequently, 1 and 2 will be used as input values to the next subroutine in the PPDA application. Because of this observation, we have the following claim.
Claim 5.1. Suppose a function f is a sequential composition of n subroutines f 1 ; . . . ; f n , and for 1 i n À 1, f i returns random shares of its expected results. If f n is in DNCC, then f is in DNCC.
Note that the random shares produced from f i are uniformly distributed from the viewpoint of an individual participating party (denoted by P ). Therefore, if P modifies his or her input to f i , it is impossible to derive the actual result from the random shares returned by f i . In addition, any change to the actual input or the intermediate random shares can change the input to f n . Thus, if f n is in DNCC, so is f. Using the above claim, we next show several additional PPDA applications or sequential composite functions are in DNCC.
In information retrieval, the Jaccard coefficient (JC), the Dice coefficient (DC) and the Cosine similarity (CS) are extensively used as similarity metrics to identify relevant information. For illustration purposes, assume D 1 and D 2 are two sets owned by two parties P 1 and P 2 , respectively. The metrics are defined as . is in DNCC (Example 3.2), the protocol for computing JC is in DNCC from Claim 5.1. Similar protocols can be developed to compute DC and CS using the above stages with minor modifications. Thus, the protocols or the composite functions that compute DC and CS are also in DNCC.
In addition, these metrics are commonly used to measure intracluster and intercluster distances among text documents. Therefore, text clustering techniques using these metrics are in DNCC. Moreover, secure similar document detection [21] , [22] , [36] is another PPDA application. Because it directly uses CS to measure similarity, this PPDA application is also in DNCC.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Even though privacy-preserving data analysis techniques guarantee that nothing other than the final result is disclosed, whether or not participating parties provide truthful input data cannot be verified. In this paper, we have investigated what kinds of PPDA tasks are incentive compatible under the NCC model. Based on our findings, there are several important PPDA tasks that are incentive driven. Table 2 classifies the common data analysis tasks studied in this paper into DNCC or Non-DNCC categories. Most often, data partition schemes can make a difference in determining DNCC or Non-DNCC classifications.
For any functions, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 provide a general way to determine if a function is in DNCC. In addition, Claim 5.1 can be used to analyze if a composite function is in DNCC, and it also provides a method to design a PPDA protocol that guarantees to be incentive compatible under the DNCC definition. For instance, a PPDA task can have many variations, and one common variation is to place a filter at the last step of the task to make the PPDA protocols more secure (e.g., secure similar document detection versus its threshold-based variation). According to Claim 5.1, as long as the last step in a PPDA task is in DNCC, it is always possible to make the entire PPDA task satisfying the DNCC model. Therefore, when designing a PPDA protocol, it is in our best interests to make the last step of the PPDA task incentive-compatible whenever possible.
As a part of future research direction, we will investigate incentive issues in other data analysis tasks, and extend the proposed theorems under the probabilistic NCC model. Another important direction that we would like to pursue is to create more efficient Secure Multiparty Computation techniques tailored toward implementing the data analysis tasks that are in DNCC.
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